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Abstract
We study the role of migration in the evolution of cooperation. Individuals spatially located on a square lattice play the
prisoner’s dilemma game. Dissatisfied players, who have been exploited by defectors, tend to terminate interaction with
selfish partners by leaving the current habitats, and explore unknown physical niches available surrounding them. The time
scale ratio of game interaction to natural selection governs how many game rounds occur before individuals experience
strategy updating. Under local migration and strong selection, simulation results demonstrate that cooperation can be
stabilized for a wide range of model parameters, and the slower the natural selection, the more favorable for the emergence
of cooperation. Besides, how the selection intensity affects cooperators’ evolutionary fate is also investigated. We find that
increasing it weakens cooperators’ viability at different speeds for different time scale ratios. However, cooperation is greatly
improved provided that individuals are offered with enough chance to agglomerate, while cooperation can always establish
under weak selection but vanishes under very strong selection whenever individuals have less odds to migrate. Whenever
the migration range restriction is removed, the parameter area responsible for the emergence of cooperation is, albeit
somewhat compressed, still remarkable, validating the effectiveness of collectively migrating in promoting cooperation.
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Introduction
Evolutionary game theory, as a powerful mathematical
framework, has been widely employed to model and elucidate
the issues surrounding the evolution of cooperation among selfish
individuals in disciplines of biology, social science, and economics
[1–19]. In these fields, the prisoner’s dilemma game has become a
prominent paradigm to metaphorize the cooperation problem. In
a typical prisoner’s dilemma, two players simultaneously decide to
cooperate or not. A cooperator incurs a cost c while brings a
benefit b to the other player. A defector (i.e., not to cooperate)
bears no cost and generates no benefit. Parameters b and c satisfy
bwcw0. If they have both cooperated, the group’s payoff is
maximized. But sticking to defection is always better for a given
player irrespective of the other’s strategy. The disagreement
between the best strategy for egoistic individual and that for the
group leads to the social dilemma. In addressing this conundrum,
many studies have assumed that individuals play the round-robin
tournament against all others in the population and accumulate
payoffs [20–23]. The fitness positively correlated to one’s payoff
determines its survival (reproducing offspring or replacing others)
in the next generation. In this setting, natural selection proceeds at
a rate much slower than that interaction happens, since every two
individuals play the game one time before competing to survive.
Recent experimental studies have shown that this is not always the
interaction pattern, especially in biology [24–26]. Motivated by
these studies, the authors [27] investigated how different time
scales between selection and interaction influence individuals’
evolutionary fate. In particular, an adjustable quantity, which
defines how many number of paired individuals interact before
selection occurs, uniquely controls the time ratio of selection to
interaction. The results demonstrated that rapid selection can
qualitatively alter the properties such as the stability of, the time to
arrive at, or the attraction basin of some equilibrium points. In
Ref. [28], Woelfing et al. also probed the effect of interaction
pattern on the ultimate destiny of individuals under different
selection strength, and found that the fixation probabilities rather
resemble one another for weak selection, whereas strong selection
in general results in nonnegligible difference between them.
Along with the well-mixed culture, games on structured
populations also have been extensively studied since the pioneering
work [29,30]. In these studies [29–37], a standard hypothesis is
that each site in the graph carries one individual and, edges
determine who plays with whom. Individuals each obtain an
aggregate payoff by playing games with all his directly connected
neighbors. After that, they simultaneously experience strategy
updating and are more likely to learn the strategies of their
neighbors with better performance. This is the so-called
synchronous updating. Differently, asynchronous strategy updat-
ing means that two connected individuals are chosen, and each
accumulates his payoff by interacting with all his neighbors. The
payoff determines the viability. This pattern is widely employed in
investigating the coevolution of strategies and social ties [38–46].
Individuals are able to adjust their interacting partners based on
the game outcome. Specifically, individuals are disposed to kick off
their defector neighbors if opportunities arise, and attempt to
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turn affects the possible payoff for the future interaction. The
coevolution as a feedback mechanism can greatly promote
cooperation [38–40,42,44,45].
Migration, as a way of realizing the coevolution, has received
mounting attention recently [47–49]. Instead of actively severing a
defecting neighbor, the focal individual terminates interacting with
this neighbor by deserting the current location, and moves to an
available niche which promises many cooperator neighbors, just as
Helbing et al. have pointed out that ‘‘individuals prefer better
neighborhoods, e.g., a nicer urban quarter or a better work
environment’’ [47]. Under the guidance of this idea, the authors
constructed a model of success-driven migration. Before imitating
the best performing neighbor, the chosen individual is allowed to
explore all the adjacent empty sites within an assigned distance,
and migrate to the one which potentially brings him the highest
payoff. The cost of testing these empty sites is neglected since it is
considered very small (named ‘‘fictitious play’’ in reference [47]). It
has been demonstrated that cooperation can break out under
noisy conditions. We nonetheless think that endowing individuals
with the capability to prefigure all these empty sites in their certain
neighborhoods constitutes a key element in enhancing coopera-
tion, and seemingly a little strong requirement. We here would like
to relax this assumption and investigate whether migration based
on only the outcome of previous interaction can stabilize
cooperation. In line with the Ref. [47], the pairwise interaction
is also modeled in terms of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Instead
of letting individuals interact with all their neighbors, we in each
round randomly pick up a pair of connected individuals and let
them play the two-person prisoner’s dilemma game and get
respective payoffs. According to the obtained payoffs, individuals
can infer what strategies the opponents have adopted, and then
decide whether or not to migrate. There are three possibilities with
respect to the two individuals’ strategy combination. If both are
cooperators, they stay where they reside. If one is cooperator and
the other defector, the cooperator would be privileged to leave its
current habitat and move to another permitted empty site, while
the defector stays motionless. If the two individuals are defectors,
they migrate with equal likelihood. In a generation, a certain
fraction of individuals get the chance to interact and migrate. At
the end of each generation, all individuals update their strategies
by learning more successful neighbors with larger probabilities.
We find that in this simple mechanism devoid of large
information-processing requirements, the collective migration
can uphold cooperation substantially.
A minimal ecological-evolutionary model
The artificial world is represented by a two-dimensional square
lattice with periodic boundary conditions. Of all these n|n sites,
half of them are occupied by individuals, and the rest are left
empty. 50% of the individuals are cooperators and the remaining
50% defectors. They are randomly distributed at the beginning. In
each round two connected individuals are selected to play the
prisoner’s dilemma game. Based on the game result, individuals
can speculate what strategies their opponents have adopted, and
then decide whether or not to abandon their current locations and
explore new ones. This exemplifies many biological instances
[48,50]. When a resource niche is overly exploited, animals
feeding on it would try to seek some favorable ones rather than
stay in this adverse living environment. Also there is no lack of
evidence in human society [47,49]. People are often willing to
leave their current interacting partners of being selfish, and seek
better ones to improve their welfare. Defectors always provoke
dislikes and are most likely to be disassociated. Thus when a
cooperator encounters a defector, the former can unconditionally
migrate if allowed. When two defectors are confronted, one of
them is randomly chosen to move.
As for how to migrate, a dissatisfied individual is allowed to
move to one empty site which is less than or equal to M steps from
the individual. If in the migration neighborhood of size M|M
(i.e., a rhombus centered on the individual), there are more than
one empty site, then one of them is randomly picked up to
accommodate the migrator. If no empty sites exist, the exploited
individual has no other choice but to remain in where he is placed.
Specially, M~1 means that each dissatisfied individual can move
to one of the empty sites if they exist in his von Neumann
neighborhood [51]. The restraint on migration range obviously
incorporates the ability of individuals’ cognizance. We can actually
anneal this restraint by enlarging the range. If dissatisfied
individuals are allowed to move to one of all empty sites in the
whole space, the migration can always be realized, which we
define as the global migration. In this situation, the limitations on
individuals’ migration ability and cognizance capability are
completely neglected. In terms of solitary individuals who have
no neighbors, they would hop to one of their four adjacent empty
sites when selected. This happens with a small constant probability
(:0:1), since it takes time for defectors to realize that they have
been completely secluded.
Before individuals update their strategies, up to ½s:n2=4  rounds
of interaction take place where the Gauss function ½x  denotes the
maximal positive integer less than or equal to x. In this situation
each individual averagely has a chance of s[½0,1  to play the game
for one time. Every individual stores an accumulated payoff.
Individuals are updated synchronously. Specifically, an individual
A randomly chooses one of his neighbors (B), if they exist, and
copies B’s strategy with the probability given by the Fermi
function W(vA?vB)~f1zexp½b:(PA{PB) g
{1, where PA and
PB denote the payoffs, and vA and vB strategies of individuals A
and B, respectively. The parameter b[½0,z?) regulates the
selection strength. The larger the b, the more important role the
payoff difference plays in deciding the selection gradient (b~0
means neutral drift, while b~z? indicates deterministic
learning). Solitary individuals keep their strategies unchanged. At
the beginning of each generation, all individuals’ payoffs are set to
be zero. The two-step cycle is repeated before the population
arrives at an equilibrium state. It should be noted that in the
evolutionary process, the population size remains constant.
Our philosophy is similar to Dirk et al’s [47], but differs in a
decisive manner. The consistency rests on the migration itself.
Differently, the incentive motivating individuals to move in Ref.
[47] is based on expectation of the quality of all neighborhoods
within a certain distance. Individuals can have access to the quality
at a negligible cost. In our model, individuals move just because
they are dissatisfied with their partners, with whom they have just
interacted. Individuals are totally ignorant of the action of those
who they have not interacted or interacted with before the
previous round. Apparently as far as time ordering is concerned,
future and past are the two sides of the same coin (i.e., now).
Moreover, we introduce the parameter s into our model to govern
the time scale between interaction and selection. Natural selection
acts on all individuals bias-free, yet the number of games that
individuals participate in may vary over time because of the
different viscosity resulting from the migration. Averagely
speaking, each individual gets involved in s interactions.
Therefore, we naturally marry the time scale ratio of interaction
to selection with the migration mechanism. This is quite different
from most previous studies [39,40,42], in which at most one
individual has the chance to change strategy but all other ones do
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include effects of varying time scale, different migration range,
and the selection intensity on the evolution of cooperation.
Results
Effect of migration on the evolution of cooperation
We first illustrate the results related to the evolutionary
dynamics of the population in the absence of migration
mechanism, which can be regarded as a reference (see panel (A)
in Fig. 1). The dynamics can be generally divided into three
regimes based on the fraction of cooperating individuals in the
steady state. For s approaches zero, a few but not many individuals
have chance to participate in the game and accumulate
inappreciable payoffs. Most other individuals accrue zero payoff.
Neutral drift predominates in individuals’ strategy updating. As a
result, cooperators and defectors each account for approximately
50 percentage of the population, independent of the change in the
ratio of cooperation cost c to cooperation benefit b (see the long
narrow slot of light blue in color along the vertical axis). As s
bulges, individuals’ payoffs coming from playing game navigate
the direction of natural selection. At this time, for little value of
c=b, equivalent to relatively weak advantage of defection over
cooperation, cooperators can always, albeit inferior in numbers,
survive. The presence of empty sites plays the role of completely
separating cooperators from defectors, leading to the coexistence
state, which is not a dynamical but a frozen equilibrium, as there is
not strategy switching or migration any more in this state.
Moreover, giving individuals more chance to play the game lowers
the cooperation level.
Individuals, especially advanced primates, possess instinct to
escape from unfavorable habitats. We here equip individuals with
ability of migrating. Three typical scenarios in terms of the
migration range are investigated. M~1 indicates dissatisfied
individuals can just move to the directly connected empty sites.
Under this limitation, the migration cannot always be accom-
plished. The most adverse situation is that a cooperator is
surrounded by 4 defectors. The range M~3 indicates that one
dissatisfied individual can move away if there are empty ones
among all the 24 sites, which is an almost sure event. Both M~1
and M~3 are spatially restricted patterns. Global migration is the
spatially unrestricted pattern. The average level of cooperation at
equilibrium is statistically recorded and presented as panels (B),
(C) and (D) in Figure 1 corresponding to the three scenarios
respectively. Generally speaking, there exist two threshold values,
T1 and T2, which depend on the typical migration pattern. For
c
b
vT1, cooperators successfully spread and eventually prevail in
the entire population. In diametrical contrast, for
c
b
wT2, the
population resides at a state teeming with all defectors.
Intriguingly, for medium
c
b
[(T1,T2), depending on s, the
population sees three strikingly different regimes: for small s,
defectors homogenize the entire population, while cooperators and
defectors coexist for a narrow interval of moderate s, and further
increment in s puts cooperators in the advantageous place and
thus makes them thrive. Under the M~1 migration pattern, T1
and T2 are maximized, and the red area, in which the cooperation
level is above 0:8, covers saliently larger fraction of the plot than
the other two patterns. Therefore, the restraint on the migration
range as M~1 most favors the evolution of cooperation. It is
worth emphasizing that the population exhibits no essentially
different ecological-evolutionary dynamics between M~3 and the
global migration.
To understand these observations, we now probe into the
microscopic evolutionary process. Snapshots of the distribution of
cooperators and defectors are presented in Figure 2. Panels
(A),(B),(C) and (D) show the change in the distribution in the
absence of migration as the evolution proceeds. The number of
cooperators drastically decreases at the starting phase. Occasion-
ally, several small clusters of cooperators form. Only completely
isolated defectors are likely to invade these stable clusters. Actually
such defectors are quite sparse. If they arrive at the periphery of
defector clusters, they cease moving. If they move to the periphery
of cooperator clusters, they either invade the clusters successfully
or are assimilated by the cooperators. It is impossible for them to
coexist in the long run. Thus several cooperator islands survive
permanently. Larger c=b accelerates defectors’ replacing cooper-
ators, who are unable to cluster quickly enough against the
invasion. Defectors permeate into the whole population.
Incorporating the migration mechanism into the population, the
role of empty sites completely preventing cooperators from being
invaded by defectors is removed. How quickly cooperators cluster
and how large these clusters are determine the ultimate fate of
cooperators. Whenever each individual on average gets a fat
chance (i.e., s~0:1) to involve the game, natural selection takes
place more rapidly than interaction. In each generation, repeated
interactions among the same pairwise neighbors are negligible,
therefore cooperation-enhancing force due to direct reciprocity is
hardly existential. In the incipient phase of evolution, a few small
clusters of cooperators indeed come into being, while most of
sparsely distributed cooperators are quickly defeated and demoted
to defectors. As the number of defectors increases, many defector-
defector links produce, reducing the probability that cooperators
feed cooperators. As a consequence, the network reciprocity based
on the clustering of cooperators is greatly inhibited. Furthermore,
expulsion between defectors makes them repulse each other.
Defectors incessantly move for the sake of seeking cooperators to
exploit. Defectors’ migration often destroys the stability of these
small cooperative communities, which inevitably shrink over time
and eventually die out.
As s appreciates to moderate values, the evolutionary process
exhibits remarkably different properties. At the outset, a number
of cooperator clusters of varying size build up, of which the small
ones are unable to defend the aggression of contiguous defectors
and disappear as above analyzed. As for the slightly large ones,
whether they can survive depends on where defectors invade
them. From time to time, defectors are likely to permeate the
cooperator clusters, which are coerced to split into many ones of
varying size. If they cannot gather quickly enough to defend
defectors’ invasion, these small cooperator patches vanish, and
defectors become the unique survivors. However, if it happens that
some of these clusters have expanded into some larger ones before
defectors are able to disintegrate them, the strong assortment of
cooperators makes them generally win the contest with the vagrant
defectors, and thereafter assimilate them. Consequently, these
closely huddled cooperators spread out and further enlarge their
territories, and progressively pervade into the whole space.
Averagely speaking, cooperators and defectors coexist.
Further aggrandizing s expedites the rate at which the
interaction proceeds and dissatisfied individuals migrate. More
cooperator clusters emerge. Almost all defectors are rendered to be
isolated. Given that each round a pair of individuals are picked to
interact, the isolation of defectors implicitly indicates that more
interactions befall upon cooperators, reinforcing the positive effect
of cooperator correlation and raising the likelihood of cooperators
repeatedly encountering. Once defectors travel to the margin of
the clusters, they are immediately homogenized as cooperators,
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Ironically, for defectors, the expulsion between interspecies
accelerates the mortality of themselves.
Insofar, we have found that just introducing empty sites into the
population slightly promotes cooperation, which is totally due to
the quarantine of a few cooperator clusters from defectors by these
empty sites. Whenever migration is incorporated, the insulating
effect is ruled out. Cooperation can be substantially improved for a
wide range of model parameters. For small c=b, cooperation
constitutes the unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [3]
conditioning that s is above a very small threshold value. For large
c=b, defectors prevail. For the value of c=b between these two
extremes, scenarios of defector dominance, coexistence, or
cooperator dominance possibly arise as s varies. Although
coexistence emerges both for small s near to zero and moderate
s, the rationale behind this phenomenon is quite different. In the
former case, inconspicuous number of interactions occur, thus
neutral drift steers the direction of the strategy selection. In the
latter case, natural selection decides their evolutionary fate, and
the migration mechanism makes both cooperators and defectors
have chance to dominate. From perspective of statistics, they
coexist. For s lying in between, relevant area in the plot displays
deep blue (i.e., zero cooperation level), confirming that migration
does destroy the role of empty sites serving as ‘‘insulators’’, which
Figure 1. Density of cooperators at equilibrium state as a function of the combination of s and c=b. These panels are related to different
migration patterns: (A) no migration, (B) local migration with M~1, (C) local migration with M~3, and (D) global migration, under strong
selection b~10. Those ones are related to different selection intensities: (E) b~1:2, (F) b~z?, under local migration pattern of M~1. Whenever
individuals are prohibited to move, the empty sites play the role of demarcating cooperators and defectors, leading to that a few small but not many
cooperator clusters survive the evolutionary race. This does not alter the fact that cooperators are in a disadvantageous place in contending with
defectors. Integrating the migration into the system qualitatively changes the evolutionary outcome. Under the M~1 migration pattern, a large area
sees red (full cooperative), reversing cooperators’ fate. Under global migration pattern, the area surviving cooperators is somewhat compressed, but
is still much larger than the situation of no migration. Comparing panels (E),(B) and (F) shows that increase in b proves to be adverse for the
evolution of cooperation. The red area tends to drop down as b increases. Of interest is that for large s, cooperation can always be stabilized at a
markedly large tract, even for b~z?. For small s the red area nonetheless plummets much more rapidly for increasing b. In terms of strategy
revision, b~1:2 adds the stochasticity, offering much longer time span for cooperators to agglomerate. This constitutes a key reason why
cooperators absolutely outperform defectors for relatively weak selection (b~1:2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027669.g001
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averagely has one chance to play the game (s approaching one)
and migrate, the strong assortment between cooperators and the
expulsion towards defectors make cooperators invariably win the
evolutionary race.
The relaxation on the migration range M makes the
implementation of migrating always achievable. The limitation-
free migration indubitably can expedite cooperators’ agglomera-
tion, favoring the achievement of network reciprocity between
cooperators. But we should not forget that defectors possess the
Figure 2. Distribution of cooperators and defectors in a typical evolutionary process for the prisoner’s dilemma. All simulations were
conducted on a square lattice of size 60|60 with 1800 individuals, half of which are randomly initialized as cooperators (see plot (A)). Red, blue and
white cell denotes cooperator, defector and empty site respectively. Just isolated individuals are allowed to migrate to the neighboring empty sites
((A){(D)), but dissatisfied individuals are also allowed to move to one-step away empty sites if they do exist ((E){(T)). Each row is for the same
process at different time step. The time scale ratio s varies with row. In the absence of migration, only those cooperators who are totally secluded
from defectors can survive ((A){(D)). Cooperators are doomed under rapid natural selection ((E){(H): s~0:1). For moderate s~0:5, either
defectors win the evolutionary race ((I){(L)), or cooperators get established ((M){(P)). Averagely speaking, they coexist. Cooperators always
pervade the whole population under slow natural selection ((Q){(T): s~1). Other parameters: b~10,c=b~0:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027669.g002
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bates their aggression into cooperator patches, impeding cooper-
ators’ gathering. Especially whenever defectors move to the
internal empty sites of cooperator clusters, who are probably
forced to disintegrate into several small ones. These waning
cooperator clusters become dampened in resisting invasion of
defectors. In the tug of war between the two polar effects, the
negative one greatly counteracts the positive one. This accounts
for the striking diminution of the area promoting cooperation (see
panels (B) and (C) in Fig. 1).
Role of selection intensity in the evolution of cooperation
Getting motivation from the experimental findings [52], we
have also explored how varying selection intensity affects the
evolution of cooperation under the M~1 local migration.
Results show that the less the b, the larger area promoting
cooperation. Under the most realistic situation (i.e., b~1:2),
cooperation is substantially promoted (see panel (E) in Fig. 1).
And there exists an optimal s, which ensures steady state being
full cooperative even c=b approaches 0:9. This observation can
be mainly ascribed to two fronts. On the one hand, the decrease
in b adds the stochasticity of strategy learning, offering longer
time available for individuals, especially for cooperators to forage
for identical species, before the population gets stabilized. The
formation of cooperator clusters enhances cooperators’ capacity
to prevent themselves from being invaded. On the other hand,
there is enough chance to realize the expulsion between the
defectors. The dilution of defector communities makes cooper-
ators have more chance to undergo gameplay, as well as reduces
the likelihood of defectors serving as model individuals. Actually,
we have found that for weak selection bƒ0:78, cooperators
always win the evolutionary race under the M~1 migration
pattern.
In the limit of the strong selection b~z?, the less fit one
deterministically adopts the fitter’ strategy. The evolutionarily
stable outcomes see drastic change. For small sƒ0:51, some small
cooperator clusters indeed form at the beginning. There is not
enough time space for defectors to exclude each other. Interactions
befalling upon defectors tends to lower chance that cooperators
mutually bring benefit. Defectors’ interaction accrues each
protagonist a benefit of c=b instead of zero. Because of just
storing the information concerning previous-round interacted
opponents, migration is not always favorable for cooperators, who
have to pay the cost of being exploited for each migratory move.
Even worse, some cooperators are likely to move forward and
backward between two nasty neighborhoods when defectors are
prevalent. It is demanding for cooperation to emerge. Taken
together, only when both social dilemma is relatively weak (small
c=b) and individuals experience selection at a slow rate (large s),
can cooperation evolve. Otherwise, cooperators are always
doomed (see panel (F) in Fig. 1).
Interestingly, as b increases from 1:2 to z?, the cascade of red
area contracts, meaning that the cooperation-enhancing force
resulting from migration is compromised. The increase in b
demotes the viability of cooperators at different speed for different
s. The less s, the harder it is for cooperation to establish with b’s
increasing. Once b exceeds a threshold value, the positive effect of
migration for the evolution of cooperation is completely
neutralized. In contrast, whenever each individual is averagely
able to play the game one time, cooperation can be maintained for
a large range of b. Even under the most adverse situation
(b~z?), cooperation can still emerge for c=bƒ0:53 (see panel
(F) in Fig. 1).
Discussion
We would like to compare our model with some intimately
related ones. In Ref. [50], it is demonstrated that local migration
weakens the competition, thus favoring the survival of those who
prudently use the common resource, whereas the unrestricted
migration allows one type to exclude the others. Generally
speaking, cooperation in our model can be seen as the prudent
use, while defection the over-exploitation of a limited common
resource. Our results have illustrated that local migration
promotes the evolution of cooperative behavior, consistent with
the findings [50]. Furthermore, we have found qualitatively similar
phenomena that defectors fare better in the global migration
(equivalent to unrestricted migration in [50]) whereas cooperators
turn out to be the ultimate winner under local interaction pattern
(both competition and migration) for moderate c=b. Differently,
for relatively weak advantage of defectors over cooperators,
migration, either local or global, is always able to establish
cooperation under strong selection, suggesting that migration
benefits cooperators more.
In a broad sense, the migration can be seen as the coevolution of
strategy and social ties. Comparing with previous studies
pertaining to coevolution [38,40,42,44], there are three striking
differences. Apart from individuals in the population, we also
introduce empty sites, which can stand for available resource
niches, shelters, and so forth. At the same time, we just pick up two
connected individuals to play the game rather than let them
interact with all their directly connected individuals. But up to a
certain number of pairs are selected in each generation. Thus the
time scale ratio of game interaction to strategy updating is
naturally integrated. Payoffs are also accumulated, which differs
from the literature [38,40,42,44] in which just a pair of individuals
are involved but their neighbors would not accumulate the payoff,
and in this process all other individuals do nothing. Furthermore,
instead of kicking off defecting neighbors, in our model dissatisfied
individuals choose to move away. The physical network are fixed
but the specific locations of individuals are time-changing. This
reflects such a scenario where environment is unlikely to change,
but individuals are able to decide where to live [49]. Although
individuals are randomly distributed on the network, neighbor-
hoods of varying quality differ in attracting individuals’ settlement,
leading to the diverse population viscosities from patch to patch.
Individuals therefore engage in inhomogeneous rounds of game.
This heterogeneity is a key factor promoting cooperation. Under
strong selection, strategy replacement happens at a rapid rate.
Only very strong assortment of cooperators can make them win
the competition with defectors. To arrive at this assortment, large s
is indispensable. Cooperation still builds up for small s, but that
just holds for very low c=b. Thirdly, it is the collective migration
that promotes cooperation. Unlike the assumption that individuals
are able to speculate in Ref. [47], the information that individuals
can acquire is quite limited in the present work. Even they
successfully migrate, there is no guarantee they can neighbor with
cooperators. Owing to this uncertainty, the collective coordination
of migrating is overridingly crucial to the emergence and
persistence of cooperation.
The incentive in our model for individuals to migrate is very
simple. They move away if they have been exploited by defectors.
Thus the achievement of migrating is costly. The gist of the
migration mechanism is to ‘‘win stay, lose migrate’’, which aims at
reducing the exploitation of the selfish partners. We could not
absolutely preclude the possibility that some cooperators swing
between two nasty neighborhoods. In this perspective, the
migration is risky. This to some extent discounts the effectiveness
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suggest that unknown niche exploration turns out better than
awaiting continual exploitation for cooperators. As we have
allowed unprejudicedly dissatisfied individuals to leave the current
habitats, actually, cooperators run ahead, and defectors chase
behind in the process of evolution. The local migration promotes
the competitive restraint, leading to that the short-term prosperity
of defectors trades off with the long-term persistence. Whenever
defectors arrive at the periphery of cooperators, they are either
absorbed or displace the peripheral cooperators. If the latter, the
clumping of defectors in turn breaks up the stability of the
defective communities. Under one-step local migration, these
defectors are unlikely to hunt cooperators quickly and efficiently,
which leaves cooperators with sufficient odds to agglomerate by
the trial-and-error-based migration. The clustering of cooperators
is positively correlated to their stability. Cooperators located in
these clusters are able to evolve higher levels of competitiveness
and capacity in resisting invasion. Combining these considerations
together, range-restricted migration promotes the evolution of
cooperation in quite a large tract of the model parameters.
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